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INTRODUCrIONFrom the beginning of the modern environmental movement,' the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution2 has loomed as a potential constraint on the achievement of
environmentalist ambitions.3 Through the 1970s and most of the
1980s, the Takings Clause was seldom found to limit the ability of gov-
ernment to pursue an increasingly aggressive environmental agenda.'
Indeed, the few Supreme Court opinions on takings during that period
left property owners with little more than their votes in a political
battle to protect their rights from the sometimes severe impacts of
environmental regulations. 5 The shield of the Fifth Amendment had
provided very little protection.6
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sity of Chicago; M.A. 1969, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; B.S. 1967, Mon-
tana State University. The author is grateful to Andrew Glikbarg, a 1995 graduate of
Lewis and Clark Law School, and Brett Swift, Research Attorney, Natural Resources
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1. By most accounts, the modem environmental movement began with Earth
Day in 1970. In fact, the central, and sometimes conflicting, themes of modem en-
vironmentalism are rooted in two 19th century movements: conservationism and
preservationism. See PAUL G. STOLTZ, THE AMERICAN WILDERNESS CONSERVA-
TIONISM VERSUS PRESERVATIONISM: A CLASH OF Two VISIONS (1986); PHILIP
SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT
(1993).
2. The U.S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment, provides: "nor shall private property
be taken for pubic use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. See, e.g., FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: A STUDY OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE USE
OF PRIVATELY-OWNED LAND WITHOUT PAYING COMPENSATION TO THE OWNERS
(1973). Cf. DAVID L. CALLIES & FRED P. BOSSELMAN, AFTER LUCAS: LAND USE
REGULATION AND THE TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT COMPENSATION (David L.
Callies ed., 1993).
4. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (hold-
ing that state may prohibit coal mining, which would cause subsidence of surface land,
without compensation); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (approving a
zoning plan that restricted landowner's development rights); Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (upholding landmark preservation program
against takings challenge).
5. Through the 1970s and 1980s, property rights advocates had little effective
political organization. In the last few years, property rights organizations have
emerged in virtually every state with significant political consequences. At the na-
tional level, the Republican Contract with America has led to the adoption of prop-
erty compensation measures in both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
For a survey of action at the state level, see HERTHA L. LUND, PROPERTY RIGHTS
LEGISLATION IN THE STATES: A REVIEW (1995).
6. Nor did the parallel provisions in state constitutions provide significant protec-
tion for property owners. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the
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In 1987, the Supreme Court decided three regulatory takings cases,
two of which indicated that there might still be life in the Takings
Clause.7 Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have gradually
confirmed that property owners have reason for optimism. 8 Although
the Court's votes have been close in these cases,9 even the appoint-
ment of two new justices by President Clinton has not closed the door
on the Court's revival of the Takings Clause.10
While the Supreme Court's opinions are unquestionably important,
developments in the lower federal courts give property owners even
more reason for optimism. Although the constitutional protection of
property rights is not necessarily an obstacle to environmental protec-
tion,' 1 regulation-minded environmentalists see these same lower
court developments as reason for great concern.' 2
Takings Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1892, 1944 n.229 (1992), for a catalogue of
state constitutional provisions.
7. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)(holding that the government cannot remedy a temporary taking by repealing the
offending legislation, but rather, that compensation is due); Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that the government takes property
when conditions unrelated to legitimate purposes are imposed). The exception in the
1987 trilogy was Keystone, 480 U.S. at 470, in which the Court, on facts very similar to
those held to be a taking in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), found
no taking.
8. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (finding a taking when a build-
ing permit was conditioned on the grant of an easement to the city for a bicycle path
and flood plain runoff); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886
(1992) (finding a taking when beach protection legislation had effect of prohibiting
property owner from constructing a home).
9. In Dolan, Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the Opinion of the Court, in
which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. Justice Stevens filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg joined. Justice Souter
filed a separate dissenting opinion. In Lucas, Justice Scalia delivered the Opinion of
the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and
Thomas joined. Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Jus-
tices Blackmun and Stevens filed dissenting opinions. Justice Souter filed a separate
statement.
10. Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Dolan replaced Justice White's vote, which had
been cast with the majority in Lucas, thus narrowing the majority's margin. One can
only speculate about how Justice Breyer will vote in future takings cases, but, because
he replaced dissenter Justice Blackmun, the majority will remain the same even if
Justice Breyer votes against the property owner.
11. Advocates of free market environmentalism take the position that property
rights protection is critical to wise resource management and that many, if not most,
environmental objectives will be better achieved through a clearly defined system of
property rights and free markets. See James L. Huffman, Markets, Regulation, and
Environmental Protection, 55 MONT. L. REV. 425 (1994); James L. Huffman, Protect-
ing the Environment from Orthodox Environmentalism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y
349 (1992); TERRY. L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRON-
MENTALISM (1991); REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTALISM IN THE NEW ERA (Terry L.
Anderson ed., 1995).
12. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, The End of Environment Law? Libertarian Prop-
erty, Natural Law, and the Just Compensation Clause, 25 ENVTL. L. 171 (1995).
JUDGE PLAGER
Since 1982, most of the takings cases in the federal courts have
arisen in the Court of Federal Claims and have been appealed to the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.' 3 This change has contributed to
the revival of the Takings Clause for two reasons. First, because the
Federal Circuit was a new court in 1982, most of its members were
appointed during the Reagan and Bush Administrations. 4 Thus,
there is somewhat more philosophical agreement among its members
than there is on other Courts of Appeals. Second, by limiting takings
jurisdiction to the Federal Court of Claims and the Federal Circuit,
Congress permitted the development of a specialization in takings ju-
risprudence. Such specialization allows judges to focus their attention
on particular problems and to develop both expertise and coherent
theories about how to resolve those problems.
Two recent Federal Circuit decisions, involving takings challenges
to the Army Corps of Engineers' enforcement of the Clean Water
Act's section 404 wetlands regulations,' 5 both authored by Judge Jay
Plager, are of particular importance to the future of takings jurispru-
dence. In Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States,'6 Judge Plager
challenged the reasonably Well-established distinction between physi-
cal and regulatory takings. In Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United
States,'7 the Court drew upon the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council'8 to articulate a significant
change to the three-part test that the Supreme Court set forth in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.' 9 Because the Federal
Circuit will play a major role in the development of future takings
jurisprudence,20 these two decisions, and others sure to follow as the
many takings claims emerge from the Federal Court of Claims,2' merit
careful and thoughtful analysis.
13. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988). This act re-
organized the Court of Claims, created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
and gave both courts specific subject-matter jurisdiction, including Fifth Amendment
takings claims.
14. The Federal Circuit has 17 judges, six of whom are on senior status. Of the
eleven regular-status judges, four were appointed by President Reagan and five by
President Bush.
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
16. 18 F.3d 1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
17. 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
18. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992),
19. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
20. Of course the Supreme Court has ultimate authority to define takings doc-
trine, but the Supreme Court is unlikely to hear many takings cases in the next several
years. Denial of certiorari, as in Florida Rock, 115 S. Ct. at 898, will be the most
common result for appeals from Federal Circuit decisions.
21. See, e.g., Alaska v. United States, 32 Fed. CI..689 (1995); Fallini v. United
States, 31 Fed. Cl. 53 (1994); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 411
(1994).
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I. FLORIDA ROCK INDUSTRIES V. UNITED STA TES
Prior to the 1972 enactment of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 22
Florida Rock Industries had purchased 1560 acres of land, and had
commenced phosphate mining thereon.23 Pursuant to section 404 of
the CWA,24 the Corps of Engineers ("Corps") ordered Florida Rock
to stop its mining activities in 1978, pending application for, and ap-
proval of, a dredge-and-fill permit.25 Florida Rock applied for a per-
mit for the entire 1560-acre parcel, but was advised that the Corps
would only consider an application to cover land sufficient for three
years of mining.26 Florida Rock's subsequent application for a permit
to mine 98 acres was denied by the Corps in 1980 on the basis that it
"would cause irremediable loss of an ecologically valuable wetland
parcel and would create undesirable water turbidity."27
Accepting the validity of the Corps' denial of its permit applica-
tion,28 Florida Rock filed suit in the United States Court of Claims
seeking compensation for a taking of their property. 29 The Court of
Claims found that there had been a compensable regulatory taking
and ordered the government to pay $1,029,000 to Florida Rock. 30 On
appeal to the Federal Circuit, the Court of Claims decision was found
to be in error on the appropriate measure of the after-taking value of
22. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
23. 18 F.3d 1560, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
24. The operative language of § 404 says nothing about wetlands or wetlands pro-
tection. "The Secretary may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public
hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at
specified disposal sites." 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1988). In an opinion later withdrawn,
the Seventh Circuit held that the EPA's wetlands regulations were not authorized by
§ 404 and that in any event, Congress did not have the constitutional authority to
command such regulations. Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, United States
Environmental Protection Agency, 961 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1992).
25. Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1562.
26. Id. at 1562-63.
27. Id. at 1563.
28. Florida Rock thus recognized an important distinction overlooked by most
advocates of limited Fifth Amendment protections for property owners. The fact that
the government is responsible to compensate for taken property does not mean that
the government may not pursue its regulatory objective. A property owner may be
entitled to compensation for losses that result from legitimate government actions.
The Takings Clause is not concerned with the extent of government's regulatory au-
thority.' Rather it is concerned with the wealth distribution impacts of government's
exercise of its regulatory authority. The costs resulting from government action are
real costs. The Takings Clause requires the taxpayers to bear those costs by prohibit-
ing the government from imposing those costs on individuals who happen to own
affected properties. See infra text accompanying notes 148-52.
29. Id.
30. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 8 Ct. Cl. 160 (1985), aff'd in part &
vacated in part, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Florida Rock If], cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987).
JUDGE PLAGER
the land.31 On remand, the Court of Federal Claims concluded that
after the denial of the permit, the fair market value of the land was
negligible, and reinstated the $1,029,000 award with compound inter-
est.32 Judge Plager's opinion in Florida Rock is thus the second time
that the Federal Circuit has considered this case.
In light of the Federal Circuit's earlier decision in the case, the ini-
tial question for the court was whether the Court of Claims had prop-
erly determined the fair market value of the land.33 This
determination was critical, first, to the question of whether or not
there was an unconstitutional taking, and second, if a taking was
found to have occurred, to the measure of compensation owing to
Florida Rock. The Federal Circuit differed with Judge Smith's conclu-
sion that the property had negligible value after the denial of the per-
mit,34 and, on that basis, remanded for further proceedings in the
Court of Federal Claims. 35 To guide the lower court in its reconsider-
ation of the case, Judge Plager offered an analysis that provides an
indication of what might be expected from the Federal Circuit in fu-
ture regulatory takings cases.3 6
Judge Plager began by reciting the oft-repeated formula from Penn
Central, which calls upon courts to determine whether or not there has
been a taking by balancing "the economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant, the extent to which the regulation interferes with invest-
ment-backed expectations, and the character of the Government ac-
tion."' 37 According to Judge Prager, in Florida Rock, "it [was] the
economic impact of the regulation that [was] at issue."38 Because the
lower court failed to properly evaluate the economic impact on Flor-
ida Rock, the Federal Circuit was forced to remand, but not without
31. Florida Rock II, 791 F.2d at 905. The appellate court held that the correct
measure of damages was "fair market value" rather then "immediate use" value, the
standard applied by the Court of Federal Claims. See Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1563.
32. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 161 (1990) [hereinafter
Florida Rock III], vacated, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898
(1995).
33. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F. 3d 1560, 1565-67 (Fed. Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
34. In Florida Rock II, the Federal Circuit instructed the Court of Claims to con-
sider "purchases which are made by market speculators as well as home builders and
other developers" as comparable sales in determining the market value of the land.
791 F.2d at 903; See Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1565. Based upon the Federal Circuit's
"passing reference to buyers being 'correctly informed,'" Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at
1565 (quoting Florida Rock H, 791 F.2d at 903), the Court of Claims rejected all com-
parable sales data on the ground that the purchasers lacked sufficient sophistication
and knowledge, and found that the property had no remaining value. Florida Rock
III, 21 Ct. Cl. at 172. Judge Plager's opinion instructs the Court of Claims that its view
is "contrary to generally accepted understandings of market valuation, and finally,
contrary to the working assumptions of a free market." Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1566.
35. Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1560, 1565, 1573.
36. Id at 1564-65.
37. IL at 1564.
38. Id.
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addressing the important question of when, if at all, a partial diminu-
tion in value would result in a taking.39
Based upon his reading of Lucas, Judge Plager concluded that "in
some circumstances, no balancing of factors is required,"4 because
"the economic impact factor alone may be determinative." 41 Plager
has thus linked the conclusion in Lucas, that there is a categorical tak-
ing when a regulation leaves the claimant with no remaining economic
value, to the economic impact factor from Penn Central's balancing
test. This interpretation of Lucas is important because it calls into
question the whole concept of the balancing test. There is no reason
that the balance will favor the claimant in every case when there is a
total loss of economic value. In such a case, the claimant may also
have little in the way of investment-backed expectations and the gov-
ernment action may be extremely important. In other words, the pub-
lic benefits of a regulation may well outweigh the costs to the
claimant, even when the claimant is left with no economic use of the
regulated property. Indeed, there are probably few circumstances in
which the public benefit of a regulation will not outweigh the cost
imposed upon an individual property owner. Thereforem it is not sur-
prising that, until 1987, property owners had little prospect of prevail-
ing under the Penn Central balancing test.
Judge Plager explained that the Lucas Court had found that a pre-
sumptive taking occurs when a property is left without any economic
use because "the regulation has an effect equivalent to a permanent
physical occupation."4 Although Plager seems to suggest that the
Lucas opinion's treatment of a total loss of economic use as a categor-
ical takings reflects an irrebuttably presumptive tilting of the balance
in the property owner's favor, his analysis demonstrates that the cate-
gorical taking doctrine announced in Lucas really has nothing to do
with balancing. Rather it has to do with the economic illogic of a dis-
tinction between physical occupations of property and regulatory ac-
tions that reduce the value of property.
Plager pointed out that even when the economic impact of a physi-
cal occupation is minor, the Supreme Court has found a categorical
taking without regard to the character of the government action.43 He
quoted Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in San Diego Gas & Elec-
tric Co. v. City of San Diego44 for the proposition that, from the prop-
erty owner's point of view, it matters little whether restrictions on the
use of property result from police power regulations or from condem-
39. Id. at 1567-73.
40. I
41. Id
42. Id at 1564-65.
43. lt at 1569 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419 (1982)).
44. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
JUDGE PLAGER
nation or physical invasion. 5 Thus, if there is a logic to the distinction
between physical occupations and regulatory restrictions, it has noth-
ing to do with the economic factors of the Penn Central balancing
test.
46
Judge Plager's Florida Rock opinion goes as far as it can in divorc-
ing regulatory takings doctrine from the unfortunate concept of bal-
ancing.47 While one can understand Plager's payment of lip service to
the Supreme Court's reliance on a balancing test in takings cases (the
Federal Circuit is, after all, an "inferior" court), the opinion goes far-
ther than is necessary in bowing to the mantra of judicial balancing.
For example, Plager stated in a footnote that the Lucas opinion "gives
the government a defense based on nuisance limitations that inhere in
the owner's title."'48 This defense, he said, "incorporates a degree of
balancing. '49 But the point of the Lucas nuisance analysis is that a
property owner's title is, and always has been, limited by the law of
nuisance.50 The property owner has no claim to that which is not part
of the property in question. Because the property owner's legal title
does not include the right to be a nuisance, there is simply no claim to
be made against the government, and there is nothing for a court to
balance.
Presumably, what Judge Plager had in mind, in linking the Lucas
nuisance defense to balancing, is the traditional common-law process
45. San Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. at 652 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. The distinction between regulatory impact and physical occupation is real if,
under the regulation in question, the property owner retains the right to exclude third
parties (including the government). Justice Scalia made this point in an exchange
with the counsel for plaintiff in the Dolan case. Recognizing that Mrs. Dolan could
not develop the flood plain area prior to the imposition of the easement at issue in the
case, Justice Scalia asked "what is'it that she wanted to do that she cannot do now?"
Seeking to clarify his query, Justice Scalia went on to ask: "[A]fter she complied with
the condition for the... permit, would the public have had access to the greenway?"
Mrs. Dolan's counsel answered "yes," to which Justice Scalia said: "[Tihat's one thing
she... could do now and couldn't do afterwards, which is keep other people out....
Which is pretty important." OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, Florence Dolan v. City of Tigard, Mar. 23,
1994, at 9-10.
47. Balancing tests have gradually invaded many areas of constitutional law as the
Supreme Court, since the New Deal, has sought to validate expanding governmental
powers. Rather than accept constitutional guarantees of individual rights as abso-
lutes, the Court has compromised even First Amendment rights by insisting that indi-
vidual rights must give way to government action when the government's interests are
sufficiently important. By this approach, constitutional interpretation becomes an ex-
ercise in judicial legislation. See James L. Huffman, Dolan v. City of Tigard. Another
Step in the Right Direction, 25 ENvTL. L. 143 (1995).
48. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1565 n.10 (Fed. Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 U.S. 898 (1995).
49. Id.
50. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992)
("The use of these properties for what are now expressly prohibited purposes was
always unlawful.")
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by which nuisance law has been defined over the centuries."' But this
is clearly not the sort of balancing that the Supreme Court has em-
ployed in takings jurisprudence and most other areas of constitutional
law. While the definition of specific nuisances has evolved over time,
the concept of a nuisance has remained constant.52 Constitutional bal-
ancing, however, requires courts to somehow draw a boundary be-
tween individual rights, on the one hand, and the police power of the
state, on the other. The nuisance defense of Lucas should not be un-
derstood to mean that the police power of the state is coterminous
with the common law of nuisance. The fact that nuisance law consti-
tutes a defense to a takings claim does not mean that a particular reg-
ulation is necessarily within the state's constitutional powers. This
distinction should be clear to a court whose takings jurisdiction is lim-
ited to those cases in which the claimant has not otherwise challenged
the validity of the regulation or law in question. 3
Having demonstrated the economic equivalence of physical occupa-
tion and total loss of economic use, the Federal Circuit was then faced
with deciding whether the Court of Claims correctly found that Flor-
ida Rock suffered a total diminution in value, and therefore, a cate-
gorical taking. Judge Plager was not satisfied with the lower court's
finding, which had discounted evidence of significant remaining value
notwithstanding the Corps' denial of the § 404 permit.5 4 For this rea-
son, the case was remanded to the Court of Claims a second time.
Because the evidence suggested that, on reconsideration and in light
of the Federal Circuit's guidance, the lower court might well find some
remaining economic value, Judge Plager addressed the question not
discussed in Florida Rock 11 of "what residual fair market value would
51. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules,
and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 720-721 (1973); Louise A.
Halper, Nuisance, Courts and Markets in the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1915,
54 ALBANY L. REV. 301, 304-06 (1989).
52. The evolution that characterizes the common law is usefully understood as a
reflection of changing conceptions based upon a constant principle. For a general
discussion of this theme in the context of various forms of legal rules, see Charles P.
Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 407, 420-26 (1950).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1500 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The Federal Circuit's decision in
Loveladies Harbor was delayed pending the resolution of a jurisdictional challenge
under this statute. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. & Loveladies Harbor, Unit D., Inc. v.
United States, 27 F.3d 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
54. Judge Plager pointed out that "[a] speculative market may exist in land that is
regulated as well as in land that is not, and the precise content of regulations at any
given time may not be particularly important to those active in the market." Florida
Rock, 18 F.3d at 1566. If the precise content of regulations is not important to land
speculators, it is either because the particular regulations have little impact on land
value or because it is anticipated that the regulations will be easily changed. How-
ever, when speculation is based upon an anticipated ability to influence future regula-
tions, we have created unfortunate incentives to use the regulatory system to gain
market advantage. Correctly applied, the Takings Clause should be an obstacle to
such regulation.
55. Id. at 1565.
JUDGE PLAGER
be 'adequate' to forestall a taking determination. ' 56 Should the Court
of Claims determine "that there was some (but not a total) reduction
in the overall market value of plaintiff's property as a result of the
regulatory imposition, the question will then be posed: does that re-
duction constitute a taking of property compensable under the Fifth
Amendment? 57
This question has troubled courts ever since Justice Holmes' unfor-
tunate declaration in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon58 that a regula-
tion results in an unconstitutional taking when it goes "too far."59
Courts have struggled with this vague prescription for nearly three
quarters of a century without guidance, except the portion of diminu-
tion found acceptable in other cases.60 Judge Plager undertakes to
address this important issue by asking, first, "whether a regulation
must destroy a certain proportion of a property's economic use or
value in order for a compensable taking of property to occur," and
second, "how to determine, in any given case, what that proportion
is."'61 The latter question goes to the problem of proof, which, in this
case, has been remanded to the lower court. The first question, how-
ever, goes to the heart of what could be a revolution in takings
jurisprudence.
Clearly, under Lucas, a total diminution of economic value goes too
far, but Judge Plager found no definitive indication in the Fifth
Amendment, or in Supreme Court caselaw, of whether and when a
less-than-total diminution goes too far.62 With respect to the Fifth
Amendment, he noted that "[n]othing in the language of the Fifth
Amendment compels a court to find a taking only when the Govern-
ment divests the total ownership of the property; the Fifth Amend-
ment prohibits the uncompensated taking of private property without
reference to the owner's remaining property interests. '63 With re-
spect to Supreme Court precedent, Plager cited Justice Stevens' objec-
tion in Lucas that it would be arbitrary for "'[a] landowner whose
property is diminished in value 95% [to] recover[ ] nothing, while an
owner whose property is diminished 100% recovers the land's full
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1568. The circuit court opinion makes clear that, based upon the evi-
dence in the record, this is the finding the lower court should reach.
58. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
59. Id. at 415.
60. In Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915) the Court found no taking
when there was an 88% diminution in value. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) the Court upheld a 75% diminution. In Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962), the Court upheld what the lower court
found to be a total loss of value. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 593 n.3 (2d ed. 1988).
61. Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1568.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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value,' "I and Justice Scalia's response that "Stevens' analysis 'errs in
its assumption that the landowner whose deprivation is one step short
of complete is not entitled to compensation.' "65
Returning to his earlier criticism of the distinction between physical
occupation and regulatory imposition, Judge Plager pointed out that
"[n]o such conceptual problem seems to exist when the taking is by
physical occupation."' Plager said that no one will question that
compensation would be due to the owner of a 100-acre tract whether
the government took five or ninety-five acres for a public park.67
Logically, the amount of just compensation should be proportional
to the value of the interest taken as compared to the total value of
the property, up to and including total deprivation, whether the tak-
ing is by physical occupation for the public to use as a park, or by
regulatory imposition to preserve the property as a wetland so that
it may be used by the public for ground water recharge and other
ecological purposes.68
While neither the Fifth Amendment, nor logic, suggests a distinc-
tion between partial physical takings and partial regulatory takings,
courts have struggled with the latter, at least since Justice Holmes'
observation in Pennsylvania Coal that "[g]overnment hardly could go
on if to some extent values incident to property could not be dimin-
ished without paying for every such change in the general law." 69
Judge Plager suggested that one solution to this problem would be to
deny compensation in all regulatory takings cases on the theory that
the only appropriate remedy is invalidation of the offending regula-
tion. Plager's convincing rejection of the distinction between physical
occupation and regulatory imposition is sufficient basis to discard this
approach, and, as Plager pointed out, this option was clearly rejected
in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles,7 ° in
which the Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he Fifth Amendment 'is
designed "not to limit the governmental interference with property
rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of other-
wise proper interference amounting to a taking." '" ,71 Short of a find-
ing that property has been taken for a non-public use,72 the Takings
64. Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1569 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
112 S. Ct. 2886, 2919 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
65. Id. (citing Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.8).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
70. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
71. Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1570 (quoting Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 11 (1990)
(quoting First English, 482 U.S. at 315)).
72. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229 (1984), the public use limitation merely requires that the relevant legislative
body have concluded that the statute in question is pursuant to a public use.
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Clause does not impose limits on the scope of the government's regu-
latory power.73
Because compensation, not invalidation of an offending law or reg-
ulation, is the appropriate remedy when there has been a total dimi-
nution of economic value, and because "[n]othing in the Fifth
Amendment limits its protection to only 'categorical' regulatory tak-
ings,... there remains.., the difficult task of resolving when a partial
loss of economic use ... has crossed the line from a noncompensable
'mere diminution' to a compensable 'partial taking.' "7 Noting that
"[t]he trial court will find itself with little direct case law guidance,"'7"
Judge Plager again deferred to the "classic exercise of judicial balanc-
ing of competing values. '76 But what followed indicates that Plager
understands that the problem cannot be adequately resolved by judi-
cial balancing, classic or not.
Plager quoted from three Supreme Court opinions as illustrations of
judicial balancing in the face of regulatory takings claims. 77 He re-
peated language from Penn Central about the relevance of economic
impact on the claimant and the extent of the claimant's investment-
backed expectations.78 This would seem to be the stuff of balancing.
But from Agins v. City of Tiburon79 and First English, he quoted lan-
guage that has little to do with balancing and much to do with the
principles that ought to guide interpretation of the Fifth Amendment.
Judge Plager quoted the Agins Court's statement that a judicial find-
ing of a taking reflects "a determination that the public at large, rather
than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state
power in the public interest."" He also quoted First English for the
proposition that "[ilt is axiomatic that the Fifth Amendment's just
compensation provision is 'designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' "81 If the purpose
of the Fifth Amendment is to prevent majoritarian government from
imposing the costs of public benefits on a few individuals, the courts
must find a standard that assures that in every case the constitutional
purpose is served. The balancing approach of Penn Central effectively
abandons the constitutional purpose to judicial lawmaking.
73. "It is necessary that the Government act in a good cause, but it is not suffi-
cient. The takings clause already assumes the Government is acting in the public
interest." Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1571.
74. Id. at 1570.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1570 n.27.
78. Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1570 n.28 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125).
79. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
80. Id. at 260.
81. First English, 482 U.S. at 318-19 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S.
40, 49 (1960)).
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Notwithstanding his apparent deference to balancing, Judge Plager
recognized that another approach is necessary if the courts are serious
about interpreting the Fifth Amendment so that it achieves the pur-
pose articulated in Agins and First English. With reference to the
third prong of the Penn Central test, which looks to the character of
the government action, Plager cautioned that it "should not be read to
suggest that when Government acts in pursuit of an important public
purpose, its actions are excused from liability."82 To do so, said
Plager, "would eviscerate the plain language of the Takings Clause."83
But inherent in the idea of balancing is the implication that govern-
ments will incur less liability to compensate as their purposes become
more important. A moment's reflection on the foregoing statement
will suggest another reason to be skeptical of the use of a balancing
test to determine the extent of constitutionally protected property
rights. The more important the public purpose, presumably the
greater the public benefit, from which should follow a Ereater rather
than a lesser willingness and obligation to compensate. 
Although he purports to set forth an improved approach to balanc-
ing, Judge Plager recognized the roots of a solution to the "too far"
problem that has bedeviled the courts since Pennsylvania Coal. Odd
as it may seem, those roots are firmly planted in the very opinion that
led courts into the regulatory takings thicket. In Pennsylvania Coal,
Justice Holmes articulated the concept of "reciprocity of advan-
tage. ' 85 It is a concept that is directly responsive to the constitutional
objectives stated in Agins and First English. The idea is that some
regulations impose comparable costs and benefits on the same people,
often the population in general, but sometimes particular segments of
the population. In these cases, affected property owners will bear
some of the costs of a regulation, but they will also experience some of
the benefits. It is under these circumstances that Holmes would con-
clude that a regulation has not gone too far. A regulation has gone
too far when it violates the principle stated in Agins and First English,
such as when the costs of broadly experienced public benefits are im-
posed arbitrarily on particular individuals.
Judge Plager stated that "[w]hen there is reciprocity of advantage,
• . . the claim that the Government has taken private property has
82. Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1571.
83. Id.
84. Within a constitutional jurisprudence of judicial balancing, a general presump-
tion of legislative validity makes sense when the public purpose is very important. For
example, a judge might reasonably conclude that speech can be limited when the sur-
vival of the Constitution is in imminent peril. However, because compensation can
constitutionally remedy invasions of property rights, there is no need to make this
difficult choice when regulations take private property. "Both the public purposes
and the rights of the property owner, to the extent those rights are reflected in the
market value of the property, can be served without sacrificing one to the other."
Huffman, supra note 47, at 145 n.18.
85. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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little force: the claimant has in a sense been compensated."86 Plager
was right to focus on Holmes' idea of the reciprocity of advantage, but
a better understanding of that idea was proposed several years ago by
Professor Richard Epstein.87 The fact that burdened property owners
experience reciprocal advantages does not change the impact on their
property. If a particular regulation results in a taking when there are
no reciprocal benefits, it makes no sense to conclude that there is not
a taking when reciprocal benefits exist. It does make sense to ac-
knowledge that in both instances there is a taking, but in the latter
there is compensation.88 What remains is to determine only whether
the compensation is just. As with other judicial standards for defining
the constitutional relationship between the state and the individual,
the reciprocity of advantage approach to "adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good" 89 does not
require mathematical precision. At best it will be a rough guide, but
rough justice is better than injustice. It does not require complex cal-
culations to know when the government is "allocating to some
number of individuals, less than all, a burden that should be borne by
all[.] )790
Judge Plager's analysis will permit the courts to understand the "too
far" problem in the context of the limited democratic government es-
tablished by the Constitution. When significant numbers of people
are impacted by government regulation, the majority will constrain
itself. But when only a few are impacted, the only protection against
majoritarian tyranny are constitutional guarantees of individual rights.
The Takings Clause, as Judge Plager has interpreted it, is a constraint
on the unavoidable tendency of democratic government to take from
the few to provide benefits for the many.
Judge Plager concluded with the acknowledgement that there may
be cases in which economic value is lost but there is no taking. The
logic of most of his argument, however, does not permit this result.
By rejecting the distinctions between physical and regulatory takings
and between total and partial diminutions of economic value, Plager
has persuasively and correctly demonstrated that the Fifth Amend-
ment "prohibits the uncompensated taking of private property with-
86. Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1570.
87. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EM-
INENT DOMAIN (1985) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, TAKINGS]. See also James L. Huffman, A
Coherent Takings Theory At Last: Comments on Richard Epstein's PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN, 17 ENVTL. L. 153 (1986).
88. In light of Senator Joseph Biden's disparaging comments about Professor Ep-
stein's book during Justice Clarence Thomas' confirmation hearing, it is not surprising
that Judge Plager might be hesitant to rely upon Epstein. These comments notwith-
standing, Epstein has offered one of the most coherent analyses of the takings prob-
lem. See Huffman, supra note 87.
89. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
90. Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1571.
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out reference to the owner's remaining property interests." 91
Although Judge Nies, in dissent, contends that "the majority theory of
a 'partial' taking . .. conflicts with current Supreme Court prece-
dent, '92 Judge Plager has in fact done a masterful job of drawing upon
Supreme Court case law to bring much-needed reason to the muddled
area of regulatory takings law.
II. LOVELADiES HARBOR V. UNITED STA TES
Loveladies purchased 250 acres in 1958.91 By the time Congress
enacted the Clean Water Act94 in 1972, Loveladies had developed and
sold 199 acres.95 To develop the remaining 51 acres, Loveladies
needed permission from both the Corps and the New Jersey Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection ("NJDEP").9 6 Loveladies spent
several years in negotiation and litigation with the State of New Jersey
before finally reaching a settlement in 1981, pursuant to which Lovela-
dies agreed to grant a conservation easement affecting 38.5 acres to
the state in return for a permit to fill and develop the remaining 12.5
acres.97 Loveladies then sought the requisite § 404 permit from the
Corps.98 Pursuant to its administrative procedures, the Corps sought
the views of the NJDEP which stated that although it had granted a
state permit under the terms of the settlement agreement, it did not
find the project to be in compliance with the state's requirements. 99
The NJDEP further opined that a denial of the federal permit would
be appropriate."° In May 1982, the Corps denied the permit. 10
Loveladies then brought an action in the Federal Court of Claims
seeking compensation for property taken in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. °2 After a trial on the merits, the court found for Love-
91. Id at 1568.
92. Id at 1574 (Nies, C.J., dissenting).
93. Loveladies Harbor v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1994), reh'g,
en banc, denied, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 28462 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 29, 1994).
94. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
95. Id.
96. Id
97. Id. See In re Loveladies Harbor, Inc., 422 A.2d 107 (N.J. Super. App. Div.
1980), cert. denied, 427 A.2d 588 (N.J. 1981). Because one of the 12.5 acres was al-
ready filled, the permit application was for 11.5 acres. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at
1174.
98. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1174.
99. Id.
100. Id
101. Id
102. Id. Prior to filing its claim in the Court of Claims, Loveladies challenged the
Corps' permit denial in Federal District Court under the Administrative Procedures
Act. The District Court held against Loveladies in a decision affirmed on appeal.
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. & Loveladies Harbor, Unit D, Inc. v. Baldwin, Civ. No. 82-
1948 (D.N.J. Apr. 3, 1984), aff'd 751 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1984). The takings claim was
filed after the District Court decision and before the decision on appeal. The govern-
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ladies and awarded $2,658,000 plus interest in compensation. 10 3 The
government appealed to the Federal Circuit, which, after the resolu-
tion of a jurisdictional challenge,"° affirmed the lower court's finding
for Loveladies. 105
Judge Plager began his opinion for the Federal Circuit by reaffirm-
ing a point he had made in Florida Rock.10 6 "What is not at issue,"
wrote Plager, "is whether the Government can lawfully prevent a
property owner from filling or otherwise injuring or destroying vital
wetlands." 107 Although he went on to assert "that every effort must
be made individually and collectively to protect our natural heri-
tage,"' 8 his point in stating what is not at issue is, or should be, that
the Takings Clause requires compensation for property taken pursu-
ant to otherwise legitimate governmental action.1°9 Whether a gov-
ernment action is otherwise legitimate depends upon existing
constitutional and statutory authorization, not upon the judge's per-
ception of the importance of the government's objectives.
The question in Loveladies, said Judge Plager, is "when the Govern-
ment fulfills its obligation to preserve and protect the public interest,
may the cost of obtaining that public benefit fall solely upon the af-
fected property owner, or is it to be shared by the community at
large." 110 Plager's opinion in Florida Rock had addressed and an-
swered this same question by quoting language from Agins and First
English that expressly states that the purpose of the Fifth Amendment
is to assure that the costs of public benefits are borne by the public
rather than by selected individuals."' As in Florida Rock, Plager gave
extensive lip service to the concept of judicial balancing, 1 2 but prop-
ment eventually moved for dismissal of the appeal in the takings case on the basis of a
lack of jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, denied the government's
motion and the appeal on the merits was ordered to proceed. Loveladies Harbor, Inc.
& Loveladies Harbor, Unit D, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
103. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1174-75 (citing Loveladies Harbor, Inc. & Love-
ladies Harbor, Unit D, Inc. v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 153 (1990)).
104. See supra note 106.
105. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1183.
106. 18 F.3d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995) ("The
Fifth Amendment 'is designed "not to limit the governmental interference with prop-
erty rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper
interference amounting to a taking."' " (quoting Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 11
(1990) (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 315 (1987)))).
107. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1175.
108. Id.
109. As Judge Plager stated in Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1570, the Supreme Court's
decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
315 (1987), makes clear that compensation for loss, not invalidation of an offending
regulation, is the remedy for violation of the Takings Clause.
110. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1175.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
112. Judge Plager describes the problem as "balancing the legitimate claims of the
society to constrain individual actions that threaten the larger community, on the one
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erly concluded that the role of the court is "to implement and enforce
... public policy as it appears in ... the words of the Constitution and
the controlling pronouncements of the Supreme Court. '113 In per-
forming that judicial role, Judge Plager concluded that the Supreme
Court has, in fact, reduced the role of judicial balancing in takings
cases by making a significant modification to the Penn Central test.114
As background for his explanation of the effect of Lucas on the
Penn Central balancing test, Judge Plager provided a brief history of
the Supreme Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence."15 In the early
period following Pennsylvania Coal, two issues emerged: (1) whether
"objective legal criteria" or "ad hoc inquiry" would be the basis for
finding a regulatory taking, and (2) whether the appropriate remedy
for a regulatory taking is "a post hoc declaration of invalidity" or an
order for compensation based on the conclusion that the restraint is
otherwise valid.1 6
Not until 1978, according to Plager, did the Supreme Court attempt
to answer the first question, by articulating three criteria relevant to
determining whether a regulation has gone "too far. 11 7 The first of
these criteria, "the character of the governmental action," was then
interpreted to require an assessment of the asserted governmental in-
terest, 1 8 and the relationship between the government's objective and
the means used to achieve that objective. 119 The second criterion,
"economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,"'' 2 became "a
threshold requirement that the plaintiff show a serious financial
side, and, on the other, the rights of the individual and our commitment to private
property as a bulwark for the protection of those rights." Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d
at 1175.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1179.
115. Id. at 1175-78.
116. Id. at 1176.
117. Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)).
118. Id. (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984)).
119. Id. (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)).
Some commentators and courts have interpreted Nollan as adding a nexus require-
ment to the already confusing takings jurisprudence. For example, the briefs in Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), were dominated by this understanding of
Nollan. While the Nollan opinion does discuss the relationship between the chal-
lenged regulation and its purpose, it offers no explanation for the relevance of this
connection to the requirements of the takings clause. As indicated above, supra note
28, the legitimacy of a government regulation is irrelevant to whether or not compen-
sation is required by the Fifth Amendment. A regulation unrelated to its (constitu-
tional) purpose may either lack constitutional authorization or violate due process. If
so, it is invalid. In such cases, compensation of affected property owners may be re-
quired by the Takings Clause, but compensation will not make the regulation valid.
Nor does compensation for takings that result from legitimate regulations make those
regulations invalid. The nexus requirement has nothing to do with takings law.
Rather, it has to do with whether government has the constitutional authority to regu-
late and whether it has implemented such authority in conformance with due process.
120. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1176.
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loss,' 1 2 1 requiring a denial of "economically viable use" of affected
property.122 The third criterion, "interference with distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations," was interpreted to require that affected
property have been acquired "in reliance on a state of affairs that did
not include the challenged regulatory regime.'
'1 23
The second issue that had persisted since Pennsylvania Coal-the
appropriate remedy-was not answered in Penn Central because no
taking was found in that case.124 Not until First English, said Judge
Plager, did the Supreme Court "finally and definitively" conclude that
because "[t]he Constitution... requires just compensation for a regu-
latory taking from the date it occurs until the date of the regulation's
rescission or amendment,"' 25 a post hoc declaration of invalidity is not
adequate.' 26
Thus, concluded Judge Plager, takings law at the time Loveladies
was decided in the Federal Court of Claims required monetary com-
pensation for regulatory takings of property. 127 A regulatory taking
would be found if:
(1) there was a denial of economically viable use of the property as
a result of the regulatory imposition;
(2) the property owner had distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions; and
(3) in the balance between the property owner's right to own and
use the property without unwarranted governmental interference
on the one hand, and on the other, the public interest asserted by
the Government in support of the regulatory imposition, the liberty
interest of the property owner should prevail.'
After the Court of Claims decision and before the Federal Circuit
decision in Loveladies, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Lucas.
That decision, according to Judge Plager, reflected a fundamental
change in takings law.' 29 Rather than "clarify how courts were to bal-
ance public interest claims against liberty claims of private property
owners," 30 as many observers expected, the Lucas court, in Plager's
words, "recast the issue."'13'
The question, said the Court, was not one of balance between com-
peting public and private claims. Rather the question is simply one
of basic property ownership rights: within the bundle of rights which
121. Id at 1177.
122. Id. (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
123. Id. (citing Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pen-
sion Trust for S. Cal., 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2291-92 (1993)).
124. Id
125. Id
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id at 1178-79.
129. Id at 1179.
130. Id. at 1178.
131. Id. at 1179.
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property lawyers understand to constitute property, is the right or
interest at issue, as a matter of law, owned by the property owner or
reserved to the state?132
If Judge Plager's interpretation of Lucas is correct, the effect is to
replace: judicial balancing with the more appropriate judicial task of
determining the nature of a claimant's property rights and the extent
to which a regulation interferes with those rights. Thus, after Lucas, a
regulatory taking exists if:
(1) there was a denial of economically iviable use of the property as
a result of the regulatory imposition;
(2) the property owner had distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions; and
(3) it was an interest vested in the owner, as a matter of state prop-
erty law, and not within the power of the state to regulate under
common law nuisance doctrine. 33
A comparison of tha third factor of Judge Plager's summary of pre-
Lucas takings law with the third factor of his summary of post-Lucas
takings law evidences what Plager described as a "sea change."'" It
removes "from regulatory takings the vagaries of the balancing pro-
cess, . . . [and] substitute[s] instead a referent familiar to property
lawyers everywhere.... 135 Despite his recurrent deference to bal-
ancing as a continuing aspect of takings law, Judge Plager's interpreta-
tion of Lucas will eliminate the uncertainties of judicial balancing and
substitute the promise "of predictability for both property owners and
regulators. "136
Having provided a revised description of regulatory takings law af-
ter Lucas, Judge Plager returned to the specific takings claim in Love-
ladies.137 Whether the court should apply Judge Plager's revised
three-part test depends, in the first instance, upon whether there has
been a total or partial diminution of economic value. 3 s If the loss of
economic value is total, it is a categorical taking under Lucas and
there is no need to resort to the three-part regulatory taking test.139
But this determination, which "depends on what is the specific prop-
erty that was affected by the permit denial,"' 4 ° is not readily apparent
on the facts of Loveladies. If the relevant parcel for the purpose of
preregulation valuation is the 12.5 acres for which a fill permit has
been denied, then there is probably a total loss of economic use and
therefore a categorical taking. However, if the relevant parcel for the
132. Id.
133. Id
134. Id
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1180.
138. Id
139. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct 2886, 2900 (1992).
140. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1180.
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purpose of preregulation valuation is the original 250 acres that Love-
ladies acquired in 1952, or the 51 acres that it still owned at the time of
permit denial, then there is probably a partial diminution of economic
value and the revised three-part test will apply. With reference toKeystone Bituminous Coal v. DeBenedictis,la4 Judge Plager called this
"the denominator problem."'142
On the facts in Loveladies, Judge Plager concluded that because the
claimant no longer owns 199 acres of the original parcel, and because
the State of New Jersey has acquired an easement in 38.5 of the re-
maining acres, 43 the denominator is the 12.5 acres for which the per-
mit was denied.1'" Because the denominator is the same as the
numerator, there has been a total loss of economic value, a categorical
taking, and no basis for the application of the revised three-part
test.145 Indeed, Judge Plager's extensive discussion of the post-Lucas
approach to regulatory takings when there is a partial diminution of
economic value is far more relevant to Florida Rock than to Lovela-
dies Harbor. This may help to explain why Chief Judge Nies's sepa-
rate opinion in Florida Rock seems to be dissenting from the majority
opinion in Loveladies Harbor.46 In light of Judge Plager's persuasive
demonstration that there is no principled difference between physical
invasions and regulatory takings, and his abandonment of the partial
diminution analysis of earlier Supreme Court decisions, he might
properly have concluded in Loveladies Harbor that the denominator
problem is nonexistent. A taking is a taking, whether of a portion or
of all of a person's property.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
Together, Florida Rock and Loveladies Harbor constitute a rare ef-
fort by a lower federal court to independently articulate a rational
understanding of regulatory takings law. Rather than continue the
tradition of trying to understand recent Supreme Court decisions in
the context of the incoherent precedent of the last half century,147
Judge Plager has gone beyond the Supreme Court's recent piecemeal
adjustments to takings doctrine to offer a comprehensive approach
141. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
142. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1180.
143. Justice Scalia, ever willing to call a spade a spade, would probably refer to this
easement acquisition by New Jersey as extortion. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (quoting
J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981)).
144. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1181.
145. Id. at 1182.
146. Chief Judge Nies was not on the panel in Loveladies Harbor.
147. See Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Joseph Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); James L. Huffman, Avoiding
the Takings Clause Through the Myth of Public Rights: The Public Trust and Reserved
Rights Doctrines at Work, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVrL. L. 171 (1987).
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rooted in the purpose of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. But
contrary to Chief Judge Nies's contention in her Loveladies Harbor
dissent, Judge Plager has not exceeded his role as judge on an inferior
court. To the contrary, Plager has taken his role seriously by carefully
interpreting both the Constitution and the Supreme Court's opinions.
Takings jurisprudence can only benefit from such clear and thoughtful
analysis.
In sum, the Florida Rock and Loveladies Harbor decisions make
clear that the traditional distinction between physical and regulatory
takings is of limited relevance, and therefore that the distinction be-
tween partial and total diminution in economic value is without logical
foundation. Although Judge Plager was cautious about his critique of
judicial balancing in the context of takings cases, his analysis suggests
that balancing is no longer appropriate to takings law and should also
contribute to a skepticism about constitutional balancing tests in gen-
eral. The implications for environmental regulation are therefore
significant.
This does not mean, as Judge Plager has emphasized in both opin-
1481ions, that a revived Takings Clause will limit the regulatory powers
of government. Rather it only requires compensation when property
has been taken by the otherwise constitutional exercise of government
powers. This limit has always been understood when government
physically occupies private property. The Florida Rock and Lovela-
dies Harbor opinions make clear that the limit also applies when gov-
ernment regulates private property. While most environmental
interests insist that an extension of the compensation requirement to
regulatory takings will make it impossible for government to regulate,
there is no reason to assume that the costs of regulatory takings will
be more prohibitive than the costs of physical takings. In either case,
the government must determine whether the public benefits of its ac-
tions justify the associated costs. As Judge Plager pointed out by
quoting from both Agins and First English, if the government does not
bear those costs, they will be borne unfairly and disproportionately by
particular individuals.'49 Like the external costs of private action that
often justify environmental regulation, the impacts on private prop-
erty of government regulation impose real costs whether borne by the
government or by particular individuals. Under the Constitution, gov-
ernment may be required to incur the costs of authorized regulations.
The Fifth Amendment merely limits government's options for passing
those costs on to property owners.
In some regulatory settings, the indirect costs of regulations in the
form of limitations on the use and value of property are widely shared
as are the benefits of the regulation. From the point of view of prop-
erty owners, there is a reciprocity of advantage to such regulations.
148. See supra notes 106-07.
149. See supra notes 80-81.
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Many zoning and building code regulations fall into this category.
Normally the courts have concluded that there is no taking in such
cases because of the reciprocal benefits to affected property own-
ers.150 A better explanation is that there has been a taking followed
by implicit compensation,' 5' which may or may not be adequate.
In other regulatory settings, the indirect costs of regulations in the
form of limitations on the use and value of property are borne by
discrete individuals whose property rights do not entitle them to en-
gage in the regulated activity. This does not necessarily mean that
regulated property owners acted illegally prior to the limiting regula-
tion. Rather, they may have acted with the assumed knowledge that
the government could impose regulations or that a neighbor might
bring a private action in trespass or nuisance. Many pollution regula-
tions would fall into this category. This is what Judge Plager, relying
on Lucas, called the nuisance defense.152 Correctly understood, it is
not an defense, rather it is a recognition that a regulation that forbids
property owners from doing what they had no legal right to do in no
way infringes on the owner's property rights. In such cases, there is no
taking.
In still other regulatory settings, the indirect costs of regulations in
the form of limitations on the use and value of property are borne by
discrete individuals whose property rights do entitle them to engage in
the regulated activity, but there are no compensating reciprocal bene-
fits. In such cases, there has been a taking and just compensation is
due. The nature of the sought-after public benefit in these cases often
makes them directly analogous to physical takings in which the gov-
ernment routinely resorts to eminent domain. In the context of con-
temporary environmental regulations, the most significant examples
are wetlands and endangered species protection. In both situations,
the focus of the government's regulatory effort is discrete parcels of
land constituting wetlands or endangered species habitat.
If followed in subsequent Federal Circuit opinions, and if not
turned back by the Supreme Court, Judge Plager's "sea change" in
takings jurisprudence will have a significant impact on the future of
environmental regulation. While most environmentalists will bemoan
the anticipated consequences, the results may well prove beneficial for
both individual liberty and the environment.
150. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1980).
151. It does not follow, however, that major governmental initiatives can go
forward only if cash or other property is explicitly transferred to persons
whose property has been taken. The Constitution speaks only of "just" com-
pensation, not of the form it must take. In principle, therefore, the state may
provide compensation in whatever form it chooses. This proposition indi-
cates the importance of implicit in-kind compensation.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 87, at 195.
152. Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1565 n.10.
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